

Problem Set 1 - Electoral competition and voter behaviour

Political Economics II (EC38011) Spring 2024

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Instructions

It is optional, but highly encouraged to submit solutions to the problem sets. My suggestion for problem 3 and 4 is to choose one and do a thorough job with the empirical part. I think the learning will be higher from doing one well rather than both sloppy.

In order to submit either email them to mattias.folkestad@iies.su.se please submit a zip-file if you have multiple documents, such as code.

If you want feedback do hand them in a day or so before the TA-session on February 9th.

Problems

1. **Noncredible commitments and probabilistic voting** Problem 3.8.1 in Persson et al. (2000)
2. **Lobbying** Problem 3.8.5 in Persson et al. (2000)
3. **Women's suffrage.** The role of women voters in the expansion of the government in the US is the topic of Lott and Kenny (1999). In this exercise we will see how the relationship holds up if we include more countries in the sample. We also learned that voter turnout keeps on increasing after a reform that expanded the franchise, in this particular case female suffrage in the US. In general newly franchised groups have an initially lower turnout (see Morgan-Collins (2023) for deeper analysis of the case of women.).
 - a) Use the data on government expenditure and year of female suffrage provided (or by all means find alternative sources) in order to analyse the relationship between female suffrage expansion and the size of government. Discuss your findings.
 - b) Discuss some of the plausible explanations for the initial difference in turnout between men and women after female enfranchisement.

- c) Are there any reasons to ex-ante expect convergence in turnout? For gender gap in particular and other suffrage extensions in general?
 - d) Discuss some of the factors that should correlate with faster/slower/any closing of the turnout gap.
 - e) (Extra) Find some data on the gender (or other) turnout gap for other countries than the US? Can some of the hypothesis discussed be tested?
4. **Moral values and voting.** In this exercise we are revisiting Enke (2020). Enke provides a model for probabilistic voting and extends the model with moral values with interesting predictions.
- a) Using the conceptual framework presented in section II of the paper derive the optimal level of moral universalism for a presidential candidate. I.e the parameter θ_j . For a closed form solution we need a distributional assumption on the popularity shock ϵ which can be set to uniform with density ϕ . To further simplify assume that voters are homogeneous in nonmoral characteristics ($x_i = x$).
 - b) Use the results from a) to discuss if there are empirical support for your results and why/why not they would hold up in the real world.
 - c) By using the replication files and data provided for the US 2020 presidential election you will now extend Enke's analysis in table 6 with another elections year. Discuss your results and the implications for external validity of the findings in the paper.
 - d) (Extra) If you are interested I have also added text-data for campaign rhetoric for Donald Trump and Joe Biden in the 2020 election. Using the raw data and following the methodology outlined in the paper one can reproduce figure 6A with another elections year added which perhaps is an even better test for the usefulness of the model.

References

- Enke, B. (2020, October). Moral Values and Voting. *Journal of Political Economy* 128(10), 3679–3729.
- Lott, Jr., J. R. and L. W. Kenny (1999, December). Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government? *Journal of Political Economy* 107(6), 1163–1198.
- Morgan-Collins, M. (2023, June). Bringing in the New Votes: Turnout of Women after Enfranchisement. *American Political Science Review*, 1–16.
- Persson, T., G. Tabellini, et al. (2000). Political economics.